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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
create a substantive right in the beneficiary by becoming part of every local
contract,' whereas the Florida statute is procedural, applicable only to suits
in Florida courts. 14 Just how this distinction bears on the ultimate issue is
open to question, because state characterization of its own statute as substan-
tive or procedural for conflict of laws purposes does not bind the federal
courts on the question of constitutionality.' If the effect of its application
is to give the lex fori unwarranted control over foreign contracts in disregard
of the lex loci contractus, the statute may be deemed unconstitutional when
used in that manner.'6  Some control is tolerated, depending on the forum's
interest in the subject matter of the contract,'7 but the mere fact that one
of the litigants is a citizen of that state, as in the instant case, does not
constitute sufficient interest to warrant such extraterritorial power.' 8
It becomes apparent then, that characterization by the state court of the
Florida penalty statute as procedural does not circumvent the rule in the
Dunken case on the basis that the Texas statute was substantive, because
the effect in both instances is exactly the same,-the foreign insurer would
be subjected to forum penalties which were not assessable in the state where
the contract was executed. Thus, agreeing with the dissent,19 it is submitted
that the holding in the instant case is directly opposed to the prevailing rule
as set forth in the Dunken ease.2°
SALES - LITERARY PROPERTY - IMPLIED WARRANTY
Plaintiff, purchaser of all rights in a story, sued for alleged breach of
an express warranty of marketability of title after notice that a third party
was claiming a portion of the proceeds of the sale. Held, that despite the
use of the words "complete," "unconditional" and "unencumbered," de-
scribing the title, an express warranty was not created and a warranty of
13. See Feller v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of the United States, 57 So.2d 581,
584 (Fla. 1952).
14. Ibid.
15. See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 406-407 (1930).
16. See Hartford Ace. & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143
1934) (statute of limitations); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389 (1924)
penalty statute); Bish v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp. Ltd., 102 F. Supp. 343
(W.D. La. 1952) (direct action statute).
17. See Hartford Aec. & Indemnity Co. v. Delta Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143,
150 1t934).
.Id. at 149.
19. Feller v. Equitable life Assur. Soc'y of the United States, 57 So.2d 581, 587
(Fla. 1952) (referring to Aetna v. Dunken, Thomas J., dissenting, said, "We are in no
position to disagree when the Supreme Court of the United States has spoken on a
matter involving the interpretation and application of the Constitution of the United
States.").
20. Cf., Mutual Ben. Health & Ace. Ass'n. v. Bowman, 96 F.2d 7, 10 (Sth Cir.
1938) (where the court said, "While there are facts in this case not like those in Aetna
v. Dunken, [cit. omitted], yet that case is controlling here because the facts leave no
doubt that this policy ds a contract made in New Mexico and, therefore not subject to
the Nebraska statute allowing attorney's fees."
CASES NOTED
marketability of title will not be implied in a contract for the sale of personal
property. Loew's Inc. v. Wolff, 101 F. Supp. 981 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
At coimmon law there was no implied warranty of marketability of title
in the sale of personal property,' and the Uniform Sales Act adopted by
most of the states is notably silent on the subject.2 The doctrine of implied
warranty of marketability of title is found almost exclusively in the sale of
real property. An agreement to sell realty is in reality an agreement to
convey title to land,3 and in the absence of any provision to the contrary, the
law implies an undertaking to convey a "marketable" title to the purchaser.
4
A marketable title is a record title, clear on its face, and free from reasonable
doubt as to matters of both fact and law.5 A purchaser of real property may
rescind the contract of sale if there is a valid cloud on the record title.6
While the distinction between sales of real and personal property dates
back to early common law, the reasons for the difference are still applicable
today. It has long been the practice to record titles to real property.7 The
courts can without difficulty search the records to see if the title is "market-
able" and enforceable. Sales of personal property8 are not usually recorded
and hence no objective test of the validity of the seller's title can be obtained.
If a purchaser could claim the right to rescind for every interference or
claim, whether it be just or unjust, there would be no assurance of finality
in any sale of goods, and the courts would be powerless to enforce any con-
tract for the sale of personalty.
Literary property is personalty, and therefore the doctrine of implied
warranty or marketability of title is not generally applied.' 0 Literary prop-
erty rights are analagous to patent rights." Both differ somewhat from
1. 1 VILLISTON, SALES § 217 (Rev. ed. 1948).
2. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1733 (1949); UNIFORM SALES ACT § 13.
3. See Altschul v. O'Neil, 35 Ore. 202, 203 (1899).
4. Alabama Butane Gas Co. v. Torrant Land Co., 245 Ala. 500, 185 So.2d 91
(1944); Oliver v. Poules, 312 Mass. 188, 44 N.E.2d 1 (1942); Rogers v. Gruber, 351
Mo. 1033, 174 S.W.2d 830 (1943); Stern v. Gepe Realty Corp., 289 N.Y. 274, 45
N.E.2d 440 (1942); Burris v. Hastert, 191 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. 1946); Ackerman v. Car-
penter, 113 Vt. 77, 29 A.2d 922 (1942).
5. Johnson v. Malone, 252 Ala. 609, 42 So.2d 505 (1949); Silvast v. Asphnd, 93
Mont. 584, 20 P.2d 631 (1933); Northhouse v. Tortenson, 146 Neb. 187, 19 N.W.2d
34 (1945); Lund v. Emerson, 204 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. 1947); O'Meara v. Saunders, 199
S.W.2d 689 (Tex. 1946).
6. Lohmeyer v. Bower, 170 Kan. 442, 227 P.2d 102 (1951); Rudisaile v. De
Boughem, 361 Mo. 917, 237 S.W.2d 166 (1951); LaCourse v. Kiesel, 366 Pa. 385, 77
A.2d 877 (1951).
7. Phoenix Title and Trust Co. v. Old Dominion Co., 31 Ariz. 324, 253 Pac. 435
(1927).
8. Gibson v .Stevens, 8 How. 384 (U.S. 1850).
9. Ibid.
10. Caliga v. Inter-Ocean Newspaper Co., 157 Fed. 186 (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1907),
affirmed, 215 U.S. 182 (1909) (same rules and benefits apply to literary property as
personal); Frohman v. Ferris, 238 Ill. 430, 87 N.E. 327 (1909), aff'd, 23 U.S. 424
(1911). Contra; Hollywood Plays Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 299 N.Y. 61, 85
N.E.2d 865 (1949) (purchaser may rescind if there is any doubt in the title offered-
need not be bad in fact, if clouded by apparent defects or uncertainty).
11. Consumers' Gas Co. v. American Electric Construction Co., 50 Fed. 778 (C.C.A.
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ordinary goods in that they are products of the intellect and both are matters
of public concern.' 2  Nevertheless, they follow the rules applicable to per-
sonal property.'
3
The only implied warranties in the sale of personal property, both
tangible and intangible are (1) that the seller has the power to sell, (2)
that the buyer has the right to enjoy quiet possession and (3) that the goods
are free at the time of sale from encumbrances in favor of a third person.
14
A purchaser of personal property must show a paramount contrary title from
which loss is certain to occnr. "  He cannot rescind for mere doubt of, or
cloud upon, the seller's title' or even upon discovering an outstanding claim
asserted by a third party.' 7  If he voluntarily yields to a third person, be
does so at his own peril.' 8
Neither in the sale of real property, nor in the sale of personal
property, is there any assurance that the buyer will be forever free from all
unjust or illegal interference.' The rights of the parties may differ, how-
ever, and the laws governing one may not be applicable to the other.2
Thus the court properly refused to extend the doctrine of implied warranty
of marketability of title to the sale of literary property.
TORTS-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-EXCLUSIVE
REMEDY DOCTRINE
The plaintiff's wife, employed by the defendant, received an award
under the New Jersey Workmen's Compensation Act.' The plaintiff, with-
out his wife's joinder, then sued the defendant for loss of consortium. Held,
affirming a summary judgment for the defendant, 2 the plaintiff's action was
barred by the compensation act." Danek v. Hommer, 9 N.J. 64, 87 A.2d 5
(1952).
3rd Cir. 1892); The Electron, 74 Fed. 689 (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1896); Geist v. Stier, 134 Pa.
216, 19 Atl. 505 (1890).
12. lerzog v. Heyman, 151 N.Y. 587, 45 N.E. 1127 (1897).
13. Consumers' Gas Co. v. American Electric Construction Co., 50 Fed. 788 (C.C.A.
3rd Cir. 1892) (no defense if third party threatens suit); Herzog v. leyman, 151 N.Y.
587, 45 N.E. 1127 (1897) (can rescind only after reasonable defense).
14. CAL. Cry. CODE § 1733 (1949); UNIFORM SALES ACT § 13.
15. Barasch v. Kramer, 62 Misc. 475, 115 N.Y. Stipp. 176 (Sup Ct. 1909).
16. Hall v. Cocliranc, 24 Colo. App. 528, 135 Pac. 980 (1913); Duke v. California
Investment Co., 132 Wash. 32, 231 Pac. 20 (1924); Contra: Hollywood Plays Inc. v.
Columbia Pictures Corp., 299 N.Y. 61, 85 N.E. 865 (1949).
17. Jones v. Hood, 46 S.W. 71 (Tex. 1898).
18. Courtney v. Gordon, 74 Mont. 408, 241 Pac. 233 (1925).
19. Wilson v. Calvert, 96 F. Stpp. 597 (D. Ariz. 1951) (vendor of realty can only
be expected to give good or marketable title); Rife v, Lybarger, 49 Ohio 422, 31 N.E.
7681(1892).. Gibson v. Stevens, 8 How. 384 (US. 1850).
1. N.J. R.v. STAT. § 34:15-1 et seq. (1937).
2. Danek v. Hommer, 14 N.J. Super. 607, 82 A.2d 659 (County Ct. 1951).
3. "Such agreements shall be a surrender by the parties thereto of their rights to
amy other method, form or amnount of compensation or determination thereof .... and
